Clarification/Follow-up by Junya on 09/14/07 11:37 pm:
If you want to see the whole section, here is it.

[80875] Sentencia De anima, lib. 3 l. 2 n. 9
Deinde cum dicit si igitur probat quod supposuerat; scilicet quod unus et idem sit actus sensibilis et sentientis, sed ratione differant, ex his quae sunt ostensa in tertio physicorum. Ibi enim ostensum est, quod tam motus quam actio vel passio sunt in eo quod agitur, id est in mobili et patiente. Manifestum est autem, quod auditus patitur a sono; unde necesse est, quod tam sonus secundum actum, qui dicitur sonatio, quam auditus secundum actum, qui dicitur auditio, sit in eo quod est secundum potentiam, scilicet in organo auditus. Et hoc ideo, quia actus activi et motivi fit in patiente, et non in agente et movente. Et ista est ratio, quare non est necessarium, quod omne movens moveatur. In quocumque enim est motus, illud movetur. Unde, si motus et actio, quae est quidam motus, esset in movente, sequeretur, quod movens moveretur. Et sicut dictum est in tertio physicorum, quod actio et passio sunt unus actus subiecto, sed differunt ratione, prout actio signatur ut ab agente, passio autem ut in patiente, ita supra dixit, quod idem est actu sensibilis et sentientis subiecto, sed non ratione. Actus igitur sonativi vel soni est sonatio, auditivi autem actus est auditio.

I have translated this into Japanese. So I can give it to you in English with explanations to philosophical terms.

And you can also search the passage in the page http://www.corpusthomisticum.org/can3.html by using the searching tool of the browser. (Copy the sentences I gave, and paste it on the searching box.)

Clarification/Follow-up by Junya on 09/16/07 1:38 am:
Here is my translation of the whole section.

Then at the passage "si igitur" the philosopher proves what he had thought.

The thought is, of course, that the actuality of the sensible object and the actuality of what senses is one and the same, but that to the human mind they are different. It is shown in the 3rd book of Physics.

There it was shown that,
just as motion <=a moving and a moved are in what is moved>,
action and passion are in what is acted,
that is, in what is movable and receiving.

By the way, the sense of hearing is what receives (from the sound).

So necessarily,
just as the sound in actuality (which is called "sounding") ,
the sense of hearing in actuality (which is called "hearing") is in what is in potentiality, that is, in the organ of hearing.

This is because the actuality of what acts and moves happens not in what acts and moves, but in what receives and is moved.

That is the explanation of why all that move are not necessarily moved.
Whatever has a movement, is moved .
So, if motion and action (action is a kind of motion) was in what moves,
it follows that what moves is moved.

As said in the 3rd book of Physics,
action and passion are one actuality in a subject ,
except that they differ to the human understanding.

Just as action is known as what is received from the agent,
passion is known as what is in the receiver,
and it is what is said above,
that is,
the actuality of a sensible object and the actuality of what senses are the same in a subject,
except that they are not the same for the human understanding.

The actuality of what can sound, that is, a sound, is sounding.
The actuality of what can hear, is hearing.

Clarification/Follow-up by Junya on 09/16/07 9:36 pm:
"That is the explanation of why all that move are not necessarily moved.
Whatever has a movement, is moved .
So, if motion and action (action is a kind of motion) was in what moves,
it follows that what moves is moved."

This part looks confusing in my translation, but at this part Aquinas might be saying that "what moves is moved" is logically inconsistent and impossible.

Clarification/Follow-up by Junya on 09/17/07 7:54 am:
Hi.

I'm sorry for having involved you too much in my concern. I wish this may not be a big labor to you.