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| The ISG report |
ETWolverine |
12/08/06 |
Well, I finally read the report. It took me two days to do it, but then again, wading through that much crap takes time, and I left my hip-boots home. But I have now finished reading it.
Twice.
I didn't want to make any comments until I was sure that I understood the report thoroughly. Now I do.
I feel like I need a shower.
When we really get down to the meat of this report, the crux is the recommendations. Below are the 79 recommendations made by the ISG, along with my comments.
--------
RECOMMENDATION 1:
The United States, working with the Iraqi government, should launch the comprehensive New Diplomatic Offensive to deal with the problems of Iraq and of the region. This new diplomatic offensive should be launched before December 31, 2006.
(A diplomatic "offensive", eh? Sounds interesting. We've been trying to make diplomatic moves in Iraq for 3 years, but a "new offesive" sounds good. What will it consist of?)
RECOMMENDATION 2:
The goals of the diplomatic offensive as it relates to regional players should be to:
i. Support the unity and territorial integrity of Iraq.
ii. Stop destabilizing interventions and actions by Iraq’s neighbors.
iii. Secure Iraq’s borders, including the use of joint patrols with neighboring countries.
iv. Prevent the expansion of the instability and conflict beyond Iraq’s borders.
v. Promote economic assistance, commerce, trade, political support, and, if possible, military assistance for the Iraqi government from non-neighboring Muslim nations.
vi. Energize countries to support national political reconciliation in Iraq.
vii. Validate Iraq’s legitimacy by resuming diplomatic relations, where appropriate, and reestablishing embassies in Baghdad.
viii. Assist Iraq in establishing active working embassies in key capitals in the region (for example, in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia).
ix. Help Iraq reach a mutually acceptable agreement on Kirkuk.
x. Assist the Iraqi government in achieving certain security, political, and economic milestones, including better performance on issues such as national reconciliation, equitable distribution of oil revenues, and the dismantling of militias.
(Alright, now I'm stumped. How do the goals of this proposed "new diplomatic offensive" differ from what Bush and the State Department have been trying to do till now? Which one of these is the "new" part?)
RECOMMENDATION 3:
As a complement to the diplomatic offensive, and in addition to the Support Group discussed below, the United States and the Iraqi government should support the holding of a conference or meeting in Baghdad of the Organization of the Islamic Conference or the Arab League both to assist the Iraqi government in promoting national reconciliation in Iraq and to reestablish their diplomatic presence in Iraq.
(So this committee, in its brilliance, has determined that the best way to solve the problems of Iraq is to set up another committee... which will debate, hem and haw, pat each other on the back for their brilliance, and generally get nothing done as most committees do. Why didn't I think of that?)
RECOMMENDATION 4:
As an instrument of the New Diplomatic Offensive, an Iraq International Support Group should be organized immediately following the launch of the New Diplomatic Offensive.
(Ok. "Immediately" sounds good. I guess accomplishing nothing quickly is better than accomplishing nothing slowly.)
RECOMMENDATION 5:
The Support Group should consist of Iraq and all the states bordering Iraq, including Iran and Syria; the key regional states, including Egypt and the Gulf States; the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council; the European Union; and, of course, Iraq itself.
(Wow. Iraq should be part of the Support Group TWICE. I guess that's a pretty good suggestion since it is their country that the Iraq Support Group would be making decisions on. Does this mean that they get twice the vote in this committee as all the other members?
And Iran and Syria? I had to read this part over again because I wasn't sure I had read it correctly. Aren't Iran and Syria the countries that have been supporting and fomenting the insurgency and the sectarian violence? Why in the hell would ANYONE suggest making them part of the group that will help make major decisions about Iraq? Isn't that like sitting down with the Mafia and asking their help in stopping organized crime?)
Other countries—for instance, Germany, Japan and South Korea—that might be willing to contribute to resolving political, diplomatic, and security problems affecting
Iraq could also become members
(Germany? Isn't this the same Germany that has been obstructive about the war in Iraq and the larger global war on terror since day one?)
RECOMMENDATION 6:
The New Diplomatic Offensive and the work of the Support Group should be carried out with urgency, and should be conducted by and organized a the level of foreign minister or above. The Secretary of State, if not the President, should lead the U.S. effort. That effort should be both bilateral and multilateral, as circumstance require.
(Urgency? Again, I guess a quick rush to nowhere is better than a slow rush to nowhere. And I'm glad to see that the Support Group would consist of high-ranking diplomats who will accomplish nothing rather than low-level flunkies who will accomplish nothing.)
RECOMMENDATION 7:
The Support Group should call on the participation of the office of the United Nations Secretary- General in its work. The United Nations Secretary-General should designate a Special Envoy as his representative.
(Ooooh, the UN. Now we're talking about a body with more experience than any other in accomplishin nothing. They'll make a great addition to the non-resolution of this problem. Great idea.)
RECOMMENDATION 8:
The Support Group, as part of the New Diplomatic Offensive, should develop specific approaches to neighboring countries that take into account the interests, perspectives, and potential contributions as suggested above.
(Another terrific idea. Kowtow to other nations on behalf of Iraq... especially Iran and Syria. That will go a long way toward helping this Support Group accomplish nothing, but will cost Iraq and the USA more than if we hadn't kowtowed.)
RECOMMENDATION 9:
Under the aegis of the New Diplomatic Offensive and the Support Group, the United States should engage directly with Iran and Syria in order to try to obtain their commitment to constructive policies toward Iraq and other regional issues. In engaging Syria and Iran, the United States should consider incentives, as well as disincentives, in seeking constructive results.
(I think I missed something here. Didn't the Baker commission ask Iran and Syria if they would like to work with the USA to help solve the problems in Iraq? Didn't they turn the Baker commission down cold? That's what Jim Baker said yesterday at a press conference. So why would we engage in diplomacy with nations that have directly turned down the idea of diplomacy and are aggressive nations who are fomenting the problems in the first place. Baker's reasoning, when asked at the press conference yesterday, was that if we ask them and they turn us down, we can hold them up to international scrutiny. Big whoop! How does that help Iraq?)
RECOMMENDATION 10:
The issue of Iran’s nuclear programs should continue to be dealt with by the United Nations Security Council and its five permanent members (i.e., the United States, United Kingdom, France, Russia, and China) plus Germany.
(Yeah, because they have been so effective and successful in dealing with it until now. And all those nations have been SOOO cooperative and helpful.)
RECOMMENDATION 11:
Diplomatic efforts within the Support Group should seek to persuade Iran that it should take specific steps to improve the situation in Iraq.
(OOOOH, that'll convince 'em. Talk about "specific steps" instead of "general steps" that Iran should refuse to take.)
RECOMMENDATION 12:
The United States and the Support Group should encourage and persuade Syria of the merit of such contributions as the following:
•Syria can control its border with Iraq to the maximum extent possible and work together with Iraqis on joint patrols on the border. Doing so will help stem the flow of funding, insurgents, and terrorists in and out of Iraq.
• Syria can establish hotlines to exchange information with the Iraqis.
• Syria can increase its political and economic cooperation with Iraq.
(Great idea. Since Syria is directly responsible for arming and funding the insurgents, asking them to pretty please stop will definitely be an effective deterent. Isn't this a little like asking the fox to guard the hen-house?)
RECOMMENDATION 13:
There must be a renewed and sustained commitment by the United States to a comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace on all fronts: Lebanon and Syria, and President Bush’s June 2002 commitment to a two-state solution for Israel and Palestine.
(First of all, how is this any different from what Bush has been doing all along?
Second, why is Israel being linked to Iraq? Is Israel's conflicts with Hamas and Hizbollah in any way influencing the insurgents in Iraq or the Iraqi people? Not that I have seen. This just seems to be a way of bribing Iraq's neighbors to get involved in the Support Group. But why is Israel being used as the bribe? What will Israel get in return?)
RECOMMENDATION 14:
This effort should include—as soon as possible—the unconditional calling and holding of meetings, under the auspices of the United States or the Quartet (i.e., the United States, Russia, European Union, and the United Nations), between Israel and Lebanon and Syria on the one hand, and Israel and Palestinians (who acknowledge Israel’s right to exist) on the other. The purpose of these meetings would be to negotiate peace as was done at the Madrid Conference in 1991, and on two separate tracks— one Syrian/Lebanese, and the other Palestinian.
(Again, this is just a way of bribing OTHER nations to be part of the Iraq Support Group. This report is suggesting that the USA throw its staunchest ally in the Middle East to the wolves in exchange for support from nations that are not trustworthy and have never supported the USA before. It's a rediculous recommendations.)
RECOMMENDATION 15:
Concerning Syria, some elements of that negotiated peace should be:
•Syria’s full adherence to UN Security Council Resolution 1701 of August 2006, which provides the framework for Lebanon to regain sovereign control over its territory.
•Syria’s full cooperation with all investigations into political assassinations in Lebanon, especially those of Rafik Hariri and Pierre Gemayel.
•A verifiable cessation of Syrian aid to Hezbollah and the use of Syrian territory for transshipment of Iranian weapons and aid to Hezbollah. (This step would do much to solve Israel’s problem with Hezbollah.)
•Syria’s use of its influence with Hamas and Hezbollah for the release of the captured Israeli Defense Force soldiers.
•A verifiable cessation of Syrian efforts to undermine the democratically elected government of Lebanon.
•A verifiable cessation of arms shipments from or transiting through Syria for Hamas and other radical Palestinian groups.
•A Syrian commitment to help obtain from Hamas an acknowledgment of Israel’s right to exist.
•Greater Syrian efforts to seal its border with Iraq.
(Ohh, now that we have repeated what we want from Syria... for about the hundreth time... they'll be sure to take it to heart this time.)
RECOMMENDATION 16:
In exchange for these actions and in the context of a full and secure peace agreement, the Israelis should return the Golan Heights, with a U.S. security guarantee for Israel that could include an international force on the border, including U.S. troops if requested by both parties.
(Like I said, Baker is ready to throw Israel to the wolves as a bribe... if Israel was bombed all the way from within Lebanon's current borders, how much more will they have to take if Hizbollah gets control of the Golan Heights?)
RECOMMENDATION 17:
Concerning the Palestinian issue, elements of that negotiated peace should include:
•Adherence to UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 and to the principle of land for peace, which are the only bases for achieving peace.
•Strong support for Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas and the Palestinian Authority to take the lead in preparing the way for negotiations with Israel.
•A major effort to move from the current hostilities by consolidating the cease-fire reached between the Palestinians and the Israelis in November 2006.
•Support for a Palestinian national unity government.
•Sustainable negotiations leading to a final peace settlement along the lines of President Bush’s two-state solution, which would address the key final status issues of borders, settlements, Jerusalem, the right of return, and the end of conflict.
(Again, the first hundred times these concepts were discussed in failed peace talks must have not been enough. This time both parties will be sure to go along with it.)
RECOMMENDATION 18:
It is critical for the United States to provide additional political, economic, and military support for Afghanistan, including resources that might become available as combat forces are moved from Iraq.
(Gee, I never would have thought of that. What geniuses these committee members are. We actually need to support Afghanistan in the long term? Who would have guessed?)
RECOMMENDATION 19:
The President and the leadership of his national security team should remain in close and frequent contact with the Iraqi leadership. These contacts must convey a clear message: there must be action by the Iraqi government to make substantial progress toward the achievement of milestones. In public diplomacy, the President should convey as much detail as possible about the substance of these exchanges in order to keep the American people, the Iraqi people, and the countries in the region well informed.
(Yeah, I guess the fact that Bush said as much to Maliki several times now and the idea of milestones was rejected by Maliki doesn't mean anything. Maliki will be sure to accept milestones if we bring up the subjkect again.)
RECOMMENDATION 20:
If the Iraqi government demonstrates political will and makes substantial progress toward the achievement of milestones on national reconciliation, security ,and governance, the United States should make clear its willingness to continue training, assistance, and support for Iraq’s security forces, and to continue political, military, and economic support for the Iraqi government. As Iraq becomes more capable of governing, defending, and sustaining itself, the U.S. military and civilian presence in Iraq can be reduced.
(If the Iraqi government does what they are supposed to do, we'll continue to help them? Gee, that's another concept that I wouldn't have thought of. Where do these geniuses come up with these gems?)
RECOMMENDATION 21:
If the Iraqi government does not make substantial progress toward the achievement of milestones on national reconciliation, security, and governance the United States should reduce its political, military, or economic support for the Iraqi government.
(The carrot AND the stick? What a novel approach.)
RECOMMENDATION 22:
The President should state that the United States does not seek permanent military bases in Iraq. If the Iraqi government were to request a temporary base or bases, then the U.S. government could consider that request as it would in the case of any other government.
(Uh... yeah. Right. Whatever. Permanent bases, temporary bases, who the hell cares. It doesn't talk to the real issues in Iraq which are all tied to the insurgency.)
RECOMMENDATION 23:
The President should restate that the United States does not seek to control Iraq’s oil.
(Yeah, because the fact that we haven't grabbed Iraqi oil until now even when oil prices went up to $3/gallon hasn't convinced the Iraqis of that fact yet. Those who already believe it don't need to be convinced, and those who don't believe it are convinced that Bush is an evil oil barron anyway, and nothing he does or says will convince them.)
RECOMMENDATION 24:
The contemplated completion dates of the end of 2006 or early 2007 for some milestones may not be realistic. These should be completed by the first quarter of 2007.
(So they are proposing milestones that they admitt can't be reached by the Iraqis. WHY?!?!?!)
RECOMMENDATION 25:
These milestones are a good start. The United States should consult closely with the Iraqi government and develop additional milestones in three areas: national reconciliation, security, and improving government services affecting the daily lives of Iraqis. As with the current milestones, these additional milestones should be tied to calendar dates to the fullest extent possible.
(I have no problem with the concept of milestones. I think its a good idea. But if the Iraqis aren't going to accept the milestones, what good will that do? Should that be a reason to pull out our troops? And how will pulling out our troops help the Iraqi government reach those milestones? Won't the lack of security HINDER rather than help the Iraqi government in reaching those milestones?)
RECOMMENDATION 26:
Constitution review. Review of the constitution is essential to national reconciliation and should be pursued on an urgent basis. The United Nations has expertise in this field, and should play a role in this process.
(This is already on the table. Nothing new here.)
RECOMMENDATION 27:
De-Baathification. Political reconciliation requires the reintegration of Baathists and Arab nationalists into national life, with the leading figures of Saddam Hussein’s regime excluded. The United States should encourage the return of qualified Iraqi professionals—Sunni or Shia, nationalist or ex-Baathist, Kurd or Turkmen or Christian or Arab—into the government.
(De-Baathification and reintegration of former Baathists into society. Why didn't Bush think of that? Oh yeah... he did. Again, nothing new here.)
RECOMMENDATION 28:
Oil revenue sharing. Oil revenues should accrue to the central government and be shared on the basis of population. No formula that gives control over revenues from future fields to the regions or gives control of oil fields to the regions is compatible with national reconciliation.
(This idea has been on the table for 5 years now. Again, the committee shows its brilliance in coming up with new ideas.)
RECOMMENDATION 29:
Provincial elections. Provincial elections should be held at the earliest possible date. Under the constitution, new provincial elections should have been held already. They are necessary to restore representative government.
(I agree with this. But until the security situation can be cleared up, there can't be provincial elections that will be truly representative. Too many people will be intimidated to vote their consciences. Security has to come BEFORE any vote can take place.)
RECOMMENDATION 30:
Kirkuk. Given the very dangerous situation in Kirkuk, international arbitration is necessary to avert communal violence. Kirkuk’s mix of Kurdish, Arab, and Turkmen populations could make it a powder keg. A referendum on the future of Kirkuk (as required by the Iraqi Constitution before the end of 2007) would be explosive and should be delayed. This issue should be placed on the agenda of the International Iraq Support Group as part of the New Diplomatic Offensive.
(Yeah, because the Support Group will be so effective at finding a solution for Kirkuk. The commission's idea is brilliant... take a national powderkeg issue and turn it into an international powderkeg issue.)
RECOMMENDATION 31:
Amnesty. Amnesty proposals must be far-reaching. Any successful effort at national reconciliation must involve those in the government finding ways and means to reconcile with former bitter enemies.
(This idea has been floated and rejected by both our government and the Iraqi government. Killers must be brought to justice. Otherwise the next group of killers to come along will think that they can get away with it too. More appeasement from Baker and Co.)
RECOMMENDATION 32:
Minorities. The rights of women and the rights of all minority communities in Iraq, including Turkmen, Chaldeans, Assyrians, Yazidis, Sabeans, and Armenians, must be protected.
(Really? Minorities need legal protections of their rights as well? I never would have guessed.)
RECOMMENDATION 33:
Civil society. The Iraqi government should stop using the process of registering nongovernmental organizations as a tool for politicizing or stopping their activities. Registration should be solely an administrative act, not an occasion for government censorship and interference.
(Hmmm... is the commission intimating that an Arab govenment might be overstepping its legal and moral bounds? Naw...)
RECOMMENDATION 34:
The question of the future U.S. force presence must be on the table for discussion as the national reconciliation dialogue takes place. Its inclusion will increase the likelihood of participation by insurgents and militia leaders, and thereby increase the possibilities for success.
(Rediculous. Inclusion of the future of US force presence in Iraq as part of the talks will INCREASE INSURGENT RESISTANCE. If the terrorists think that blowing stuff up will result in US forces being pulled out of Iraq, they'll keep blowing stuff up. They need to understand that we are not going away no matter how hard they try to make us. We will leave when WE are and the Iraqi government are ready for us to do so, and not one minute earlier.)
RECOMMENDATION 35:
The United States must make active efforts to engage all parties in Iraq, with the exception of al Qaeda. The United States must find a way to talk to Grand Ayatollah Sistani, Moqtada al-Sadr, and militia and insurgent leaders.
(This idea is about as brilliant as the idea of bringing Iran and Syria into the Support Group. If we ask them to pretty please stop sending terrorists and insurgents to blow up civillians, I'm sure Mookie and Sistani will agree this time.)
RECOMMENDATION 36:
The United States should encourage dialogue between sectarian communities, as outlined in the New Diplomatic Offensive above. It should press religious leaders inside and outside Iraq to speak out on behalf of peace and reconciliation.
(Another set of ideas that nobody else has come up with before. What original thinkers there are on this committee.)
RECOMMENDATION 37:
Iraqi amnesty proposals must not be undercut in Washington by either the executive or the legislative branch.
(A broad amnesty idea is dead, as it should be. Amnesty may be granted on a case by case basis, but a blanket amnesty is a BAD IDEA. As for the idea being undercut by those within our government, when was the last time that Congress DIDN'T try to undercut the President? And now that the incoming Congress is Democat, I expect much more undercutting of the President to take place. So in plain parlace, "Don't bet on it.")
RECOMMENDATION 38:
The United States should support the presence of neutral international experts as advisors to the Iraqi government on the processes of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration.
(Ooooh! Another committee. Great idea. Why do there need to be "expert's on disarmament"? How hard is it to put all your guns in a big pile and have them loaded onto a truck to be melted down to scrap? For this we need "experts"?)
RECOMMENDATION 39:
The United States should provide financial and technical support and establish a single office in Iraq to coordinate assistance to the Iraqi government and its expert advisors to aid a program to disarm, demobilize, and reintegrate militia members.
(Oooohhhh! This new committee of experts hit the big time... they get their own office and everything.)
RECOMMENDATION 40:
The United States should not make an open-ended commitment to keep large numbers of American troops deployed in Iraq.
(Nor should they make a deadline for pullout of the troops. Just as an "open-ended committment" is a disincentive to the Iraqi government to take responsibility for their own problems, a shedule for pullout is a disincentive to terrorists to stop blowing stuff up.)
RECOMMENDATION 41:
The United States must make it clear to the Iraqi government that the United States could carry out its plans, including planned redeployments, even if Iraq does not implement its planned changes. America’s other security needs and the future of our military cannot be made hostage to the actions or inactions of the Iraqi government.
(I agree in general with this recommendation. So that makes it... what... one out of 41 so far?)
RECOMMENDATION 42:
We should seek to complete the training and equipping mission by the first quarter of 2008 as stated by General George Casey on October 24, 2006.
(Uh... yeah... about that... its already being done. How does this constitute a new direction in Iraq?)
RECOMMENDATION 43:
Military priorities in Iraq must change, with the highest priority given to the training, equipping, advising, and support mission and to counterterrorism operations.
(I disagree strongly with this. Yes, training should be a high priority item. But the highest priority item should ALWAYS be to find and kill the insurgents. THAT is what the military is really there for, and we haven't utilized their abilities in that area. We've been too concerned with training Iraqis and not enough with killing the enemy.)
RECOMMENDATION 44:
The most highly qualified U.S. officers and military personnel should be assigned to the imbedded teams, and American teams should be present with Iraqi units down to the company level. The U.S. military should establish suitable career-enhancing incentives for these officers and personnel.
(Career-enhancing incentives? What the hell? A soldier goes where he is told to go, kills who he is told to kill, and doesn't make military decisions based on personal career enhancement. If he does, he needs to be somewhere OTHER than in combat. It is pretty clear from this staement alone that the guys who wrote this report haven't got a f#(&ing clue about how the modern US military works or should work. They are thinking of the Vietnam era when soldiers were conscripts and needed incentives to do their jobs. THESE soldiers are volunteers. The modern military is a whole different animal than the military of 40 years ago.
RECOMMENDATION 45:
The United States should support more and better equipment for the Iraqi Army by encouraging the Iraqi government to accelerate its Foreign Military Sales requests and, as American combat brigades move out of Iraq, by leaving behind some American equipment for Iraqi forces.
(As I understand it, the US military is already leaving stuff behind for the Iraqi military. Nothing new here either.)
RECOMMENDATION 46:
The new Secretary of Defense should make every effort to build healthy civil-military relations ,by creating an environment in which the senior military feel free to offer independent advice not only to the civilian leadership in the Pentagon but also to the President and the National Security Council, as envisioned in the Goldwater- Nichols legislation.
(The SecDef should encourage truthful opinions from his generals. He needs honest information to make good decisions. But he should DISCOURAGE those who he disagrees with from going public with their disagreements. Just because your senior disagreed with your opinion and made a different decision than you would have is not a reason to go to the press with an exclusive interview about how terrile the SecDef is, or to be a source of "leaks" to the newspapers.)
RECOMMENDATION 47:
As redeployment proceeds, the Pentagon leadership should emphasize training and education programs for the forces that have returned to the continental United States in order to “reset” the force and restore the U.S. military to a high level of readiness for global contingencies.
(Gee, because the military hasn't already thought of that by itself. That is SOP for the military in ALL conflicts... when the troops get home, they get some downtime, and slowly rebuild to full readiness levels through training.)
RECOMMENDATION 48:
As equipment returns to the United States, Congress should appropriate sufficient funds to restore the equipment to full functionality over the next five years.
(You mean that soldiers should have fully functional equipment at all times? And that Congress should fund it? Ya don't say...)
RECOMMENDATION 49:
The administration, in full consultation with the relevant committees of Congress, should assess the full future budgetary impact of the war in Iraq and its potential impact on the future readiness of the force, the ability to recruit and retain high-quality personnel, needed investments in procurement and in research and development, and the budgets of other U.S. government agencies involved in the stability and reconstruction effort.
(You mean the government is supposed to consider the effect of war on the military? Another brilliant idea that nobody has ever thought of.)
RECOMMENDATION 50:
The entire Iraqi National Police should be transferred to the Ministry of Defense, where the police commando units will become part of the new Iraqi Army.
(Not sure I agree with this idea. If the entire police and military force is under the single command of the Ministry of Defence, doesn't that open the possibility of a coup by the Minister of Defence? Shouldn't the military be controlled by the Ministry of Defense and the police by the Ministry of the Interior in order to keep a balancce of powers? The same way that our federal police, Secret Service, military and intelligence departments are controlled out of different Departments. Just wondering.)
RECOMMENDATION 51:
The entire Iraqi Border Police should be transferred to the Ministry of Defense, which would have total responsibility for border control and external security.
(Border control is legitimately a responsibility of the Defense Ministry. I have no issue with this idea. That's 2 out of 51.)
RECOMMENDATION 52:
The Iraqi Police Service should be given greater responsibility to conduct criminal investigations and should expand its cooperation with other elements in the Iraqi judicial system in order to better control crime and protect Iraqi civilians.
(Already being worked on. But a good idea, even if they were a little late.)
RECOMMENDATION 53:
The Iraqi Ministry of the Interior should undergo a process of organizational transformation, including efforts to expand the capability and reach of the current major crime unit (or Criminal Investigation Division) and to exert more authority over local police forces. The sole authority to pay police salaries and disburse financial support to local police should be transferred to the Ministry
of the Interior.
(And how is the Interior Ministry supposed to do that if we are suggesting that the police be transferred to the Ministry of Defense? This recommendation contradicts #50.)
RECOMMENDATION 54:
The Iraqi Ministry of the Interior should proceed with current efforts to identify, register, and control the Facilities Protection Service.
(In other words, they should continue what they are already doing. Good idea. Glad they thought of it.)
RECOMMENDATION 55:
The U.S. Department of Defense should continue its mission to train the Iraqi National Police and the Iraqi Border Police, which should be placed within the Iraqi Ministry of Defense.
(In other words, they should continue what they are already doing. Good idea. Glad they thought of it.)
RECOMMENDATION 56:
The U.S. Department of Justice should direct the training mission of the police forces remaining under the Ministry of the Interior.
(Actually not a bad idea. Justice is generally more familiar with crime-stopping than the military is. The two functions are different and require different specialties. This is Justice's specialty. The ISG is now 3 for 56.)
RECOMMENDATION 57:
Just as U.S. military training teams are imbedded within Iraqi Army units, the current practice of imbedding U.S. police trainers should be expanded and the numbers of civilian training officers increased so that teams can cover all levels of the Iraqi Police Service, including local police stations. These trainers should be obtained from among experienced civilian police executives and supervisors from around the world. These officers would replace the military police personnel currently assigned to training teams.
(Again a good idea. Cops are better at training people to be cops than soldiers are. 4 for 57.)
RECOMMENDATION 58:
The FBI should expand its investigative and forensic training and facilities within Iraq, to include coverage of terrorism as well as criminal activity.
(Basically the same idea as #57. I still agree, but they don't get another point for saying essentially the same thing twice.)
RECOMMENDATION 59:
The Iraqi government should provide funds to expand and upgrade communications equipment and motor vehicles for the Iraqi Police Service.
(Iraqi cops should have cars? What a novel idea.)
RECOMMENDATION 60:
The U.S. Department of Justice should lead the work of organizational transformation in the Ministry of the Interior. This approach must involve Iraqi officials, starting at senior levels and moving down, to create a strategic plan and work out standard administrative procedures, codes of conduct, and operational measures that Iraqis will accept and use. These plans must be drawn up in partnership.
(How does this differ from what Bush has been pushing for the past 3 years? It doesn't.)
RECOMMENDATION 61:
Programs led by the U.S. Department of Justice to establish courts; to train judges, prosecutors, and investigators; and to create institutions and practices to fight corruption must be strongly supported and funded. New and refurbished courthouses with improved physical security, secure housing for judges and judicial staff, witness protection facilities, and a new Iraqi Marshals Service are essential parts of a secure and functioning system of justice.
(This is #57 again... get the US Dept of Justice to train the Iraqis. They don't get extra points for saying it a third time either.)
RECOMMENDATION 62:
• As soon as possible, the U.S. government should provide technical assistance to the Iraqi government to prepare a draft oil law that defines the rights of regional and local governments and creates a fiscal and legal framework for investment. Legal clarity is essential to attract investment.
• The U.S. government should encourage the Iraqi government to accelerate contracting for the comprehensive well work-overs in the southern fields needed to increase production, but the United States should no longer fund such infrastructure projects.
• The U.S. military should work with the Iraqi military and with private security forces to protect oil infrastructure and contractors. Protective measures could include a program to improve pipeline security by paying local tribes solely on the basis of throughput (rather than fixed amounts).
• Metering should be implemented at both ends of the supply line. This step would immediately improve accountability in the oil sector.
• In conjunction with the International Monetary Fund, the U.S. government should press Iraq to continue reducing subsidies in the energy sector, instead of providing grant assistance. Until Iraqis pay market prices for oil products, drastic fuel shortages will remain.
(Again, how does this differ from what Bush has been pushing for until now?)
RECOMMENDATION 63:
• The United States should encourage investment in Iraq’s oil sector by the international community and by international energy companies.
• The United States should assist Iraqi leaders to reorganize the national oil industry as a commercial enterprise, in order to enhance efficiency, transparency, and accountability.
• To combat corruption, the U.S. government should urge the Iraqi government to post all oil contracts, volumes, and prices on the Web so that Iraqis and outside observers can track exports and export revenues.
• The United States should support the World Bank’s efforts to ensure that best practices are used in contracting. This support involves providing Iraqi officials with contracting templates and training them in contracting, auditing, and reviewing audits.
• The United States should provide technical assistance to the Ministry of Oil for enhancing maintenance, improving the payments process, managing cash flows, contracting and auditing, and updating professional training programs for management and technical personnel
(Ditto.)
RECOMMENDATION 64:
U.S. economic assistance should be increased to a level of $5 billion per year rather than being permitted to decline. The President needs to ask for the necessary resources and must work hard to win the support of Congress. Capacity building and job creation, including reliance on the Commander’s Emergency Response Program, should be U.S. priorities. Economic assistance should be provided on a nonsectarian basis.
(Congress is gonna love this one. The Rep Congress tried to shortchange funding in Iraq in 2006 and 2007. The Dems in Congress were looking forward to an excuse to defund Iraq. I happen to agree with this idea, though. That's 5 for 64.)
RECOMMENDATION 65:
An essential part of reconstruction efforts in Iraq should be greater involvement by and with international partners, who should do more than just contribute money. They should also actively participate in the design and construction of projects.
(You have got to be kidding me. Let Iran and Syria and every other Arab country anywhere near Iraq's oil... and not expect the oil to just simply dissappear into thin air--- or rather into foreign countries' oil reserves? Why in the hell would we trust any other country to be involved with Iraq's oil infrastructure?)
RECOMMENDATION 66:
The United States should take the lead in funding assistance requests from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, and other humanitarian agencies.
(To "lead" implies that someone will follow. That won't happen if the UN is involved. If we want to solve problems of refugees and humanitarian aid, we need to keep the child rapists from the UN as far away from Iraq as possible.)
RECOMMENDATION 67:
The President should create a Senior Advisor for Economic Reconstruction in Iraq.
(Another Senior Advisor to head another comittee? Whooppeee!!! We're just running over with committees.)
RECOMMENDATION 68:
The Chief of Mission in Iraq should have the authority to spend significant funds through a program structured along the lines of the Commander’s Emergency Response Program, and should have the authority to rescind funding from programs and projects in which the government of Iraq is not demonstrating effective partnership.
(Doesn't the Cheif of Mission already have that authority? I believe he does.)
RECOMMENDATION 69:
The authority of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction should be renewed for the duration of assistance programs in Iraq.
(In other words, they should continue what they are already doing. Good idea. Glad they thought of it.)
RECOMMENDATION 70:
A more flexible security assistance program for Iraq, breaking down the barriers to effective interagency cooperation, should be authorized and implemented.
(What... no invisible wall? Agencies should work together toward a common goal? Share information and resources? What a terrific idea. I wonder if that applies to intelligence agencies back here in the USA too.)
RECOMMENDATION 71:
Authority to merge U.S. funds with those from international donors and Iraqi participants on behalf of assistance projects should be provided.
(More pooling of resources for the common goal? My, how smart.)
RECOMMENDATION 72:
Costs for the war in Iraq should be included in the President’s annual budget request, starting in FY 2008: the war is in its fourth year, and the normal budget process should not be circumvented. Funding requests for the war in Iraq should be presented clearly to Congress and the American people. Congress must carry out its constitutional responsibility to review budget requests for the war in Iraq carefully and to conduct oversight.
(I saw copies of the 2006 and 2007 budget proposals by Bush. Costs of the Iraq war were clearly stated in the budget in the military expenditures section. It had its own account line and everything. So again, this is more of what is already being done.)
RECOMMENDATION 73:
The Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the Director of National Intelligence should accord the highest possible priority to professional language proficiency and cultural training, in general and specifically for U.S. officers and personnel about to be assigned to Iraq.
(There's a shortage of Arabic-language and culture specialists in the government's employ. Unless the government is willing to splurge on copies of the Rossetta Stone Arabic Langauge software, how do Baker and Co. expect that to be accomplished? Personally, I think the Rossetta Stone software is a good idea.)
RECOMMENDATION 74:
In the short term, if not enough civilians volunteer to fill key positions in Iraq, civilian agencies must fill those positions with directed assignments. Steps should be taken to mitigate familial or financial hardships posed by directed assignments, including tax exclusions similar to those authorized for U.S. military personnel serving in Iraq.
(How does this differ from what we are doing now? If a position needs to be filled in Iraq, volunteers are sought. If there aren't enough volunteers, people are assigned to those positions anyway. I agree that we should be forgiving taxes for military and government personnel in Iraq. Frankly, I think that ALL military salaries everywhere should be tax free, regardless of assignment. I also think that mortgage payments --- principal and interest--- and electric and water bills should be automatically frozen while military or govenment personnell are assigned overseas to decrease familial hardship.)
RECOMMENDATION 75:
For the longer term, the United States government needs to improve how its constituent agencies—Defense, State, Agency for International Development, Treasury, Justice, the intelligence community, and others —respond to a complex stability operation like that represented by this decade’s Iraq and Afghanistan wars and the previous decade’s operations in the Balkans. They need to train for, and conduct, joint operations across agency boundaries, following the Goldwater-Nichols model that has proved so successful in the U.S. armed services.
(So the various departments should work together in the future and learn to respond better to emergencies? Another brilliant new idea.)
RECOMMENDATION 76:
The State Department should train personnel to carry out civilian tasks associated with a complex stability operation outside of the traditional embassy setting. It should establish a Foreign Service Reserve Corps with personnel and expertise to provide surge capacity for such an operation. Other key civilian agencies, including Treasury, Justice, and Agriculture, need to create similar technical assistance capabilities.
(A foreign service reserve corps is actually a pretty good idea... a pool of people that can be called upon for foreign diplomatic service and other functions --- such as managing reconstruction efforts --- that are called up only when special needs arise. They would go through periodic diplomatic training and testing to maintain their status as reserve diplomats. I actually like this idea. 6 for 76.)
RECOMMENDATION 77:
The Director of National Intelligence and the Secretary of Defense should devote significantly greater analytic resources to the task of understanding the threats and sources of violence in Iraq.
(Uhhhh... the threat is that a bomb will explode. The source of the threat is insurgents who plant bombs. What's to understand?)
RECOMMENDATION 78:
The Director of National Intelligence and the Secretary of Defense should also institute immediate changes in the collection of data about violence and the sources of violence in Iraq to provide a more accurate picture of events on the ground.
(Again... the bombs explode: that is the nature of the violence. The source of the violence is the guys who plant the bombs. What data do we need to collect? The number of people being killed? For what purpose? Scorekeeping? If you stop the violence by killing the terrorists, there won't be a need to collect data on terrorist attacks.)
RECOMMENDATION 79:
The CIA should provide additional personnel in Iraq to develop and train an effective intelligence service and to build a counterterrorism intelligence center that will facilitate intelligence-led counterterrorism efforts.
(Again, how does this differ from #57? That's the fourth time this idea is being stated.)
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What I see here is a document that is so full of fluff that sounds nice and looks good but has no real substance to it that it couls have only come from a committee. This document was an attempt to get everyone at the table to agree, not a hard-hitting effort to actually solve problems in Iraq. Aside from 5 or 6 good ideas, there is absolutely NOTHING in the document worthy of the 80+ pages it was printed on.
Not once is the idea of ramping up military operations to catch or kill terrorists even discussed. It doesn't say to increase force levels. It doesn't say to DECREASE force levels either. It only says "Don't make an open-ended committment of force in Iraq."
This entire document is one giant form of "Keep on doing what you have been doing, but do more of it, and do it with those who hate your guts anyway... and try to get other departments in teh US government, the UN and other Arab countries to do it too."
That's a solution? That's a change of direction?
What a f@(&ing waste of time and money.
Elliot |
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