Clarification/Follow-up by tomder55 on 10/09/06 2:07 pm:
Sung was Kim's old man .

If Saddam were still in power he would be at the head of the line to purchase the N.Korean nukes. Saddam had sent Iraqi scientists to work in Libya with the AQ Kahn network to develop an "Islam bomb " according to The International Strategic Studies Association .

One of the recently-released audio tapes from Saddam Hussein's office makes clear that by the mid 1990s, portions of Iraq's nuclear weapons program had been moved outside that country.

Sir, where was the Nuclear material transported to? A number of them were transported outside of Iraq. *** Sir, about the Nuclear program, we say that we have uncovered everything. In addition, we have an unannounced problem with the Nuclear program, and I think they know about it. I mean, there is working teams that are working and some of these teams are not known to anyone.

The ISSA analysis cites :

Given the billions of dollars which Saddam had invested in WMD, and the fact that WMD and associated delivery systems represented his only chance at strategic independence, it was inconceivable that he would not have engaged in massive strategic deception operations in the hope that, as partially demonstrated in 1991, once the US/West/UN had gone through Iraq as comprehensively as possible, he would then be free to re-import his strategic capacity, by that time at a proven and operational level. This option was lost, however, not because the US George W. Bush Administration was aware — at the White House level — of the specifics of the deception and re-deployment of WMD programs, but because of the intuitive belief by the White House that Pres. Saddam was engaged in a strategic-level build-up which threatened the region and Western interests.
Saddam utilized his best efforts and international contacts and alliances to limit the scope of debate and UN inspections to an extremely finite set of conditions, all of which focused solely on the Iraqi territory. In this, he was almost totally successful.

However, there were numerous failures to maintain the total secrecy of his actions at an operational intelligence level. This may have been inevitable, given the scope of the WMD programs being conducted in Libya, for example, where an estimated Iraqi workforce of up to 20,000 scientists, engineers and workers were engaged in WMD and missile development, and in other countries, such as Mauritania (intended as a launch site for ballistic missiles to threaten the US), where Iraqi intelligence officials were conducting aspects of the strategy.

What has emerged from the pattern of intelligence available is that Pres. Saddam took the opportunity, possibly shortly after the 1991 defeat of his Armed Forces in the first US-led Coalition war against Iraq in 1990-91, to move his WMD programs to one or more safe havens abroad. It was known, even at that point, that Iraq maintained extensive deployments of forces and some basing inside Sudan, and that Saddam and Libyan leader Mu’ammar al-Qadhafi were closely aligned in that they perceived threats from the same quarters: (a) the United States, and (b) radical Islamists. Equally, they increasingly came to the same view that they needed to work with the Islamists because the various Islamist groups — ranging from Osama bin Laden’s organization to the Iranian-led Shi’a groups — also felt threatened by, and hostile to, the United States.

Appears to me that all you need to establish the links of the threat of Saddam's WMD program and the nexus of Iraq to International Terrorism is to read this report by The International Strategic Studies Association . I note their conclusion :

The current refusal to acknowledge the regional linkages which tie the Saddam Administration in closely with the actions of Iran, Syria, Libya, Egypt and the Palestinian and other subsidiary subnational or transnational groups (including al-Qaida) is, to a large extent, governed in the US by the fact that there is strong pressure, not least from the US State Dept. and Secretary of State Colin Powell, not to “widen the war” in the face of international and domestic pressures. However, this position significantly hurts the incumbent US Bush Administration, which took a major political gamble by taking the war to Iraq based on an “intuitive” understanding of the threat which Saddam Hussein posed to regional and Western interests.

Had we taken out N.Korea before this smoking gun (nuke test ) occured you can be assured that we would be hearing the same criticism of the Bush Adm. regarding preemption that we now hear about Iraq .

Clarification/Follow-up by excon on 10/09/06 2:10 pm:

Hello again, tom:

Father - son. They all look alike to me.

You wouldn't be hearing that criticism from me.

excon

Clarification/Follow-up by tomder55 on 10/09/06 2:14 pm:
.....but you do hear it . The world says use a multi-lateral approach ;so that is what Bush attempted . Then when that did not work it's because Bush did not engage in one on one negotiations . A working model of that was tried by the previous adm. however and N.Korea clearly violated the provisions after they had feasted on the carrots.